One of the best known relics of the Great War is the Princess Mary tobacco tin of Christmas 1914

In the Upper Right Hand Corner…

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1914

One of the best known relics of The Great War is the Princess Mary tobacco tin of Christmas 1914. Intended to be sent out to every man in the king’s uniform, the lid of this small brass box is decorated with a profile portrait of the royal benefactress and the names of the nations allied to the British Empire in its struggle against the Central Powers. The obvious names are there, France and Russia from the Triple Entente; Belgium, violated by the German army as it attempted to carry out the von Schlieffen Plan. Serbia, whose ultranationalists had triggered the conflict; Montenegro, another ingredient in the perpetually unstable mixture of the Balkans and, tucked away almost unnoticed in the upper right hand corner, Japan. To many this might come as a surprise because it is often assumed that World War I was solely a European conflict. But this was an imperial age and in 1914 ‘Europe’ could be found in every corner of the globe. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, which brought the emergent Asian power into the fight on the British side, was to prove advantageous to both countries. For the British it relieved the Royal Navy of the need to keep valuable warships in a theatre thousands of miles from the focus of its activities, the North Sea and the German High Sea Fleet. For the Japanese it was an opportunity to demonstrate that their nation was a candidate for promotion from ‘regional’ to ‘world’ power.

For Japan to reach this position on the international stage had been a remarkable achievement. Unlike much of the world, she had managed to keep herself virtually isolated throughout the age of European expansion. It had taken the forcible ‘opening-up’ by America’s Commodore Perry in 1854 to bring Japan into the modern era. Reluctant at first, but with growing enthusiasm, Japan sloughed off centuries of feudalism and embraced the best, and some of the worst, of what the nineteenth century could offer. Within barely fifty years, an industrial revolution had changed forever the established agrarian economy. Warriors loyal to a hierarchy of warlords had disappeared to be replaced by a professional army. An emperor whose power had been weakened by the chief of these warlords regained prestige even if he had to make concessions towards his subjects. And if at last cognizant that she was an island nation, Japan created a navy. Obviously, the fledgling could not come to maturity on its own and assistance was sought from the established powers. The Japanese army benefited from the tutelage of German advisors, the navy from French and later British aid. As the reality of modernization took hold, so did a dream of expansion. The European empires had gained their strength by breaking through their physical boundaries and exploiting territories far from their capitals. Japan looked to their example and tried to follow it on the Asian mainland, but success in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5 alarmed some of the European powers. Led by Russia, they stepped in and robbed Japan of most of her gains. But the fact that she had fought a successful campaign against her larger neighbor gave pause for thought. Allowing Japan a junior membership in the ‘China Club’ softened the blow. She was ceded control over Taiwan, and granted what amounted to a free hand on the Korean peninsula. When the Boxer revolt broke out in 1900, Japan shelved her resentment towards the Europeans and contributed troops to the international force that vigorously suppressed the Chinese ‘rebels’.

Britain had watched these developments with great interest. Whether or not it was simply that their shared island status created a natural sympathy is open to debate, but she was prepared to court Japan. This was hardly altruistic. In addition to area-wide naval and commercial concerns there was the decades long rivalry that Britain and Russia had been engaged in for influence in India. Although the ‘Great Game’ had gone to Britain’s advantage, there was always the fear that the situation might be reversed. To help play the game, she needed friends in Asia. In particular, she would welcome a friend who would be able to monitor the important Russian Far East port of Vladivostock. The new century opened with the British Empire’s resources stretched thin in an increasingly competitive world. Not only was Russia a concern, so too were the French and the Germans. It should be remembered that this was before Edward VII’s historic rapprochement with France, and, in consequence, improved relations with Russia. Both continental nations were still naval powers to be reckoned with. Relations with Germany had soured at an alarming rate and although the German presence outside Europe was not terribly great it was becoming significant.

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty committed both sides to remain neutral if only one went to war, but if another power, or powers, entered the conflict then the other was bound to come to the aid of the first party. Thus when Japan went to war with Russia in 1904 Britain was not obliged to join forces with her new ally. Nevertheless, the conflict was not ignored, nor, given the belligerent, was it totally unwelcome. Britain sent numerous observers whose reports were studied with great interest within the military and naval establishments back in London. In particular, the Royal Navy paid a good deal of attention to the stunning Japanese victories at the Yellow Sea and Tsushima when not just one but two Russian fleets had been annihilated. Britain had a practical interest in the battles that went beyond their tactical and strategic implications for much of the Japanese fleet had been built to British designs in British yards. Here was a perfect opportunity to observe how the Royal Navy’s ships would fare in battle. The fact that the Russian Baltic fleet had been savagely mauled at Tsushima by the 12-inch guns mounted on the Japanese battleships was not lost on either of the allies. Unlike previous naval battles, the two opposing fleets had not come to close quarters until the fight was virtually over. The superior speed of the Japanese had enabled them to dictate the range to their advantage. Subsequently, it was reasoned that if 18 knots and a battery of just four 12-inch guns could produce such devastation, then what if your battleships could attain 21 knots and mount triple the number of large guns? So HMS Dreadnought was born, yet another naval race started and a conflict between the major powers edged closer, dragging a not totally unwilling Japan along with them.

When war broke out in Europe in August 1914, Britain turned to her Asian ally for help. The Royal Navy’s presence in the Far East had been allowed to dwindle quite dramatically as attention had been focused on the battle squadrons of the Grand Fleet. British strength in China consisted of a predreadnought battleship, HMS Triumph, held in reserve, two armored cruisers, HMS Minatour and HMS Hampshire, two light cruisers and eight destroyers. Besides safeguarding British interests and territory in China, this squadron was responsible for keeping Far East sea-lanes open to both essential merchant shipping and the anticipated transport of imperial troops from Australia and New Zealand to Europe. To achieve this, Britain had to be sure that enemy forces were neutralized. Given the ships available to them, this was always going to be a tall order. As chance had it, the focus of their concern, Vice Admiral Graf von Spee’s East Asiatic Cruiser Squadron, was at sea. Obviously, this powerful force of armored and light cruisers had to be found and eliminated. Normally based at Tsingtao in the German concession of Kiao-Chow in Shantung, von Spee’s ships had been on a cruise in the South Pacific since June. The actual German naval presence at the squadron’s homeport was very meager. The duty ship, the light cruiser, SMS Emden and the destroyer S.90 were the only warships of any consequence still at the fortified base.

Not surprisingly, the British Government wanted Japan to enter the conflict on their terms. There were concerns that to offer her ally the free hand she had asked for could result in the erosion of Britain’s own power and influence in the Far East. This view was not shared by everyone in the Cabinet. One of the chief advocates of bringing Japan in without restraints was the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. His opinion was to prevail. The Japanese Government carefully weighed the circumstances, sent Germany an artfully worded ultimatum on August 15^th, and on receiving the expected negative response declared war on the 23^rd. By which time, not only had Emden slipped out of port, the rest of the cruiser squadron was beyond the immediate reach of both British and Japanese forces. Although there was an element of ‘closing the stable door’ about it, the Royal Navy had begun to blockade Tsingtao in preparation for its capture. It was conceded that this operation would have to be a Japanese-led endeavor. Britain would provide a token complement of naval vessels together with a small number of troops whilst the bulk of her naval forces concentrated on the search for the ships of the East Asiatic Cruiser Squadron. Actually, the Germans had been steaming steadily eastwards and at no stage presented any real threat to the British in the Far East although a great deal of effort went into trying to track them down. It was clear to von Spee that he could not expect to return to Tsingtao and chose instead to head for South America. Appearing off the Chilean coast he scored a stunning success against the Royal Navy at the Battle of Coronel on November 1^st, but five weeks later his squadron was itself defeated at the Falkland Islands. Emden continued to lead the allied navies a merry dance throughout the Indian Ocean until she was sunk in early November off the Cocos Islands. Likewise, her activities had little or no direct bearing on events off the China Coast.

The Japanese naval force that led the attack on Tsingtao was a heavy one for the venture. Drawing on units from the Second Fleet, Vice Admiral Sadkichi Kato had on hand the three predreadnought battleships, HIJMS Suwo, his flagship, HIJMS Tango and HIJMS Iwami. All were prizes from the Russo-Japanese War. In addition, Kato had at his disposal two coastal defense ships, (also ex-Russian prizes), three armored cruisers and a destroyer flotilla with its cruiser leader. Together with these conventional units, the Japanese sent the newly commissioned seaplane carrier, HIJMS Wakamiya. The modest British contribution consisted of the battleship Triumph and the destroyer HMS Usk. Elements of the Japanese First Fleet were concentrated in the southern Yellow Sea to safeguard against any attack from von Spee should he be tempted to try and return to his base. Further south another Japanese squadron patrolled the Formosa Strait and the northern approaches to the British base of Hong Kong. In addition, other Japanese squadrons set out to search and eventually take the German possessions in the Caroline and Marshall Island groups. Yet other warships were dispatched to Canada’s West Coast and to Singapore. In effect, the Japanese navy had taken on roles the Royal Navy might have been expected to play had the 1902 treaty not been signed. This situation was not without its problems. National pride, racial differences, suspicions about Japanese intentions in China had the potential to render the alliance unworkable but, by and large, they were sublimated by an overall sense of pro-Japanese sympathy within Britain’s ‘Senior Service’. So much so that Churchill could declare during a speech to Parliament in late November that "…the Japanese Navy has effective command of the Pacific, and the utmost cordiality characterizes the workings of the Admiralties…"

On August 30^th Japanese and British troops were landed on the northern coast of the Shantung Peninsula, 150 miles above Tsingtao and began a measured march to their objective. They were in neutral territory but any control that China may have been able to exercise over its own domains had long since disappeared. The invasion force was not challenged. Meanwhile, the port and its fortifications were shelled by the warships and bombed from the air. Wakamiya’s Farman seaplanes can lay claim to have taken part in the first carrier launched air raids in history. The attack progressed slowly. Typically, the Kaiser had ordered that Tsingtao be defended to the end and that he expected the besieged troops and volunteers to do their duty "to the last". In reality, there was little anybody could do to prevent the inevitable from happening. The garrison was well supplied with both food and materiel but relief in the form of reinforcements was impossible. However, the defenders did enjoy some moments of success. On the night of October 17^th, S.90 stole out of Tsingtao to torpedo and sink the elderly Japanese cruiser turned minelayer HIJMS Takachiho. The destroyer managed to evade the other blockading ships but as escape was improbable, her crew chose to scuttle their ship. But when the Germans lost the strategic heights of Prinz Heinrich Hill it became merely a matter of time before they would have to surrender. On October 30^th, the Japanese emperor’s birthday, Japanese and British forces initiated a tremendous artillery barrage from both shore and sea, followed by infantry assaults. Although they put up a spirited final defense, the Germans were forced to capitulate on November 7^th. By this time, the remaining German naval units, a motley collection of old cruisers and gun-boats had been scuttled, as had the obsolete Austrian cruiser Kaiserin Elisabeth which had taken shelter in Tsingtao at the start of the war. Stripped of their guns for service on land or for fitting out commerce raiders, these vessels were no longer of any use to the defenders. More than 4,000 Germans were sent to Japan as prisoners. Japanese casualties numbered some 236 killed and 1,282 wounded. The British battalions lost 12 killed and 53 wounded.

With the capture of Tsingtao, Japan’s participation in the Great War shrank in importance. Although her burgeoning naval strength continued to be projected beyond her home waters, she fought no further major actions. In January 1915, Japan made clear her intentions to increase her influence in China with the sweeping "Twenty One Demands". These would have robbed the latter of much of its already severely reduced sovereignty. Although some of these demands were later dropped, China eventually acceded to a Japanese ultimatum. The Versailles Treaty confirmed the transfer of German assets in China to Japanese control. (Secret agreements with Britain enabled Japan to retain control of the Pacific islands that had once formed part of the Kaiser’s imperial dreams.) As might be expected, the United States Government viewed this situation with disfavor and at the Washington Naval conferences of 1921-22 used their undisputed power to rein in the Asian nation. The treaties that grew out of these conferences were to leave both Japan and Britain at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the US. Although a virtually bankrupt Britain could maintain the same number of capital ships as the American fleet, these would have to provide protection to a far wider area of the world. In her own eyes, Japan was returned to the status of a regional power by not being allowed to match her fleet to those of her former allies. It is hardly surprising that this became a cause of resentment. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty was allowed to lapse with some regret on both sides. However, when it was needed it had held firm and from the British stand-point provided much needed cover at a time when the Royal Navy was not as ubiquitous as its champions thought it was. Although theirs was a modest contribution, it would not be unfair to say that Japan had justified its place on Princess Mary’s gift to the British men who were serving her father on land and at sea.

Alan Weatherley